Shareholder Advisory Votes

Anatomy of a Shareholder Vote Calculation – A 2012 Update

by Vanessa Schoenthaler on February 13, 2012

(Note: this is an updated and expanded version of a post I first wrote last February)

Counting up the votes from a shareholder meeting is not as easy as one might think.

For starters, there are four different sources that dictate how votes are tabulated: the federal securities laws, the corporation laws of the state in which your company is organized, the rules of the national securities exchanges and the applicable provisions in your charter documents.

On top of that there are five different categories of votes to consider: votes for and against a proposal, broker non-votes, abstentions and withheld votes.

Then there’s the quorum requirement to be met and, finally, the approval threshold for each proposal to be considered, which can range from a “plurality of the votes cast” to a “super majority of the votes present and entitled to vote” and just about anything in between.

The Categories of Votes

Let’s start off by considering the different categories of votes and how they’re tabulated, in particular let’s look at broker non-votes, abstentions and withheld votes.

Broker Non-Votes

A broker non-vote occurs when a broker has not received voting instructions from the beneficial owner of shares held in street name, and the broker does not have, or declines to exercise, discretionary authority to vote those shares.

Whether or not a broker has discretionary authority largely depends on the rules of the self-regulatory organization (“SRO”) of which the broker is a member firm (e.g., FINRA, NYSE, Nasdaq, etc.), but can also be influenced by the Securities and Exchange Commission, which oversees the SROs and can require that they adopt rules related to discretionary voting, and by Congress through the legislative process.

Under the SRO rules that are in place now, brokers have discretionary voting authority over routine matters, a common example being the ratification of auditors. However, the rules don’t define what a routine matter is, rather they include an ever-growing but non-exhaustive list of non-routine matters.

For instance, the NYSE recently issued a Information Memo notifying member firms that it will no longer permit discretionary voting on certain corporate governance matters. Examples of these and other matters over which NYSE member firms do not have discretionary voting authority include those that:

  • are not submitted to shareholders by means of a proxy statement;
  • are the subject of a proxy contest;
  • relate to a merger or consolidation;
  • involve a right of appraisal;
  • authorize the mortgaging of property or creation of indebtedness;
  • authorize or create preferred stock or increases the authorized amount of existing preferred stock;
  • involve a waiver or modification of preemptive rights;
  • change existing quorum requirements with respect to shareholder meetings;
  • alter voting provisions or the proportionate voting power of a stock or the number of its votes per share (subject to limited exception); and
  • pertain to executive compensation or corporate governance matters, such as the election of directors, the de-staggering of boards, the elimination of supermajority voting requirements, the use of consents, the right to call special meetings and certain types of anti-takeover provision overrides.

To understand how broker non-votes are tabulated, you have to look to the corporation laws of the state in which your company is organized as well as to your charter documents.

In most states broker non-votes are considered present at a shareholder meeting and, as such, are included in the quorum calculation. At the same time, however, broker non-votes are not generally considered entitled to vote, so they have no effect on the outcome of a proposal, unless of course otherwise specified in your charter documents.

Abstentions

An abstention occurs when a shareholder affirmatively chooses not to vote on a proposal.

Under the corporation laws of most states abstentions are considered present and entitled to vote at a shareholder meeting and, as such, are included in the quorum calculation. However, abstentions are not generally considered votes cast, meaning that where a proposal requires the approval of “a majority of the votes cast” abstentions will have no effect, but where a proposal requires the approval of “a majority of the votes present” or “a majority of the votes present and entitled to vote” abstentions will have the same effect as vote against the proposal.

Withheld Votes

A withheld vote is a category of vote that has come about as a result of the Commission’s proxy rules.

Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-4 requires that a proxy for the election of directors include an option for shareholders to withhold authority to vote for a director nominee.  The rule does not, however, require that a proxy include an option for shareholders to vote against a director nominee, unless the corporation laws of the state in which your company is organized give effect to such a vote (and most don’t).

Under the corporation laws of most states directors are elected by a plurality vote, meaning that the director nominee receiving the highest number of votes, regardless of the number of votes withheld, is elected (i.e., a  director nominee can receive 1 “for” vote, while 999 votes are withheld, and still be elected).  As a consequence, over the last half-dozen or so years, companies have started to amend their charter documents and implement governance policies to give effect to withheld votes. For example, one approach has been to require a director to tender their resignation, which may or may not be accepted, if they receive a greater number of withheld votes than for votes.  Another approach has been to simply adopt a majority voting standard for the election of directors.

Counting Up the Votes

Has the quorum requirement been met?

Before any business can be transacted at a shareholder meeting there must be a quorum present.

By default most states define a quorum as the presence of a majority of the shares entitled to vote in person or by proxy.  You can modify the default requirement in your charter documents, subject to certain limitations imposed by state corporation laws (e.g., in Delaware a quorum cannot be less than one-third of the shares entitled to vote) and by the rules of the exchange on which your securities are listed (e.g., Nasdaq requires a quorum of at least 33.33% of a company’s outstanding common voting stock; NYSE generally requires a quorum of not less than a majority of a company’s outstanding shares).Quorum Requirement - Shareholder Meeting

Which adoption threshold is applicable to the proposal in question?

Once a quorum is established, the adoption threshold applicable to each proposal has to be considered and the related votes tabulated and counted.

Let’s look at this in the context of a shareholder advisory vote on executive compensation (a “Say on Pay vote”) and a shareholder advisory vote on the frequency of Say on Pay votes (a “Say on Frequency vote”). Both are non-routine matters for which brokers do not have discretionary voting authority, so shares represented by broker non-votes count as present for purposes of establishing a quorum but not as shares entitled to vote on the proposals.

Example: Say on Pay Votes

There is no standard under the federal securities laws that establishes when a Say on Pay vote has been adopted. Accordingly, you have to look to the corporation laws of state in which you are organized and to your own charter documents to determine a Say on Pay adoption threshold.

By way of example, if you are a Delaware corporation, unless otherwise provided for in your charter documents, all matters other than the election of directors generally require the affirmative vote of a majority of shareholders present in person or represented by proxy at your shareholder meeting.

Of the companies that held their first Say on Pay votes in 2011 most applied an adoption threshold of either: an affirmative “majority of the votes cast”, with broker non-votes and abstentions having no effect,

Shareholder Meeting Vote

or, as in our Delaware example, an affirmative “majority of the votes present” or ”present and entitled to vote”, with broker non-votes again having no effect, but this time with abstentions having the same effect as a vote cast against the proposal.

Shareholder Meeting Vote

Example: Say on Frequency Votes

As with the Say on Pay vote, there is no standard under the federal securities laws that establishes when a Say on Frequency vote has been adopted, and you must again look to state corporation laws and your charter documents to determine an adoption threshold.

In keeping with our Delaware example, a Say on Frequency proposal will require the affirmative vote of a majority of shareholders present in person or represented by proxy at a shareholder meeting. But how did companies apply a majority voting standard to a Say on Frequency proposal when there are three frequency options for shareholders to choose from: annual, biennial and triennial Say on Pay votes?

Of the companies that held their first Say on Frequency votes in 2011 most resolved this issue by simply adopting a plurality voting position, meaning that they considered the frequency which received the highest number of votes to be the frequency adopted by shareholders. Though nearly a third of companies took the position that an affirmative “majority of the votes cast” was necessary for the adoption of a frequency (with a plurality fall-back position, meaning that if a majority vote was not achieved the option having received a plurality of the votes would be considered the frequency adopted by shareholders).

A Note About Your  Proxy Disclosure Requirements

The proxy rules require that you disclosure the voting threshold necessary for approval of all matters submitted to a shareholder vote, other than ratification of your auditors, as well as the method by which votes will be counted, including the treatment and effect of broker non-votes and abstentions under state corporation law and your charter documents. You’d be surprised at how many companies fail to include some or even all of this disclosure in their proxy materials.

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Yesterday the Council of Institutional Investors released a white paper, prepared by Farient Advisors LLC, analyzing 37 “failed” say-on-pay votes from annual meetings taking place between January 1 and July 1, 2011, and citing another 37 votes that “passed” but by a margin of 10% or less.

The paper looks to identify “compensation practices where support for change is the greatest”, and to help investors “target initiatives for improved pay practices and provide useful input for structuring their voting policies”. At the same time, it also provides practical insights and recommendations for all companies, but particularly for those that did not achieve strong investor support or with failed say-on-pay votes.

Farient interviewed, 19 CII member organizations, including public employee pension funds, mutual funds and union pension funds, as well as the two largest proxy advisory firms — Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. and Glass Lewis & Co. — and the proxy solicitation firm Morrow & Co., LLC, to ascertain, among other things, the:

  • processes by which investors evaluated executive compensation programs and the extent to which they relied on analyses and recommendations from proxy advisory firms; and
  • factors that motivated investors to vote against executive compensations programs at companies with failed say-on-pay votes.

As to the investors’ evaluation processes, the paper concludes that:

  • investors were extremely thoughtful in how they assessed executive compensation programs, considering multiple factors and sources, performance over a number of years, and focusing on total shareholder returns;
  • investors that relied more heavily on proxy advisory firms did so in part because of resource constraints;
  • resource and staffing constraints were also cited as causing many investors to focus on outlier companies; and
  • many investors plan to revisit and potentially revise their voting guidelines in the future.

The paper also found that the factors that most frequently contributed to investors voting against executive compensations programs included:

  • the presence of a disconnect between pay and performance;
  • poor pay practices;
  • poor disclosure practices; and
  • inappropriately high levels of compensation for the company’s size, industry and performance.

CII White Paper - Say on Pay: Identifying Investor Concerns

CII White Paper - Say on Pay: Identifying Investor Concerns

The above are only a few of the paper’s key conclusions; the full paper is posted below, it’s a quick and easy read and definitely worth the time.

(Download File)

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An Update on Shareholder Advisory Votes in Graphs

by Vanessa Schoenthaler on February 24, 2011

As of February 22, 2011 250 non-TARP participating companies have filed preliminary or definitive proxy materials containing shareholder advisory votes on executive compensation (Say on Pay) and shareholder advisory votes on the frequency of Say on Pay votes (Say on Frequency).  The following is a brief update on the initial filings and results:

Shareholder Advisory Vote on Executive CompensationShareholder Advisory Vote on the Frequency of Executive CompensationShareholder Advisory Vote on the Frequency of Executive Compensation

Also as of February 22, 2011, 87 companies have disclosed the results of their initial Say on Pay vote and 88 have disclosed the results of their initial Say on Frequency vote (one smaller reporting company voluntarily complied with the Say on Frequency vote, but not the Say on Pay vote, accounting for the difference in the number of reported results).  Of the companies that have disclosed results, 86% have considered their Say on Pay vote successful if approved by a majority of shareholders and 68% have considered the Say on Frequency choice that has received a plurality of votes to be the Say on Frequency choice of their shareholders.

Shareholder Advisory Vote on Executive CompensationShareholder Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation

Of the companies have disclosed the results of their initial Say on Frequency vote 68% have reported that their shareholders have voted to approve either the same Say on Frequency choice as recommended by their board of directors or, where their board of directors has not made a recommendation, an annual, biennial or triennial choice. The remaining 32% have reported that their shareholders have voted to approve an annual Say on Frequency choice as opposed to the biennial or triennial choice recommended by their board of directors.

Shareholder Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation

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Say on Pay, Say on Frequency and Say on Golden ParachutesYesterday, in an open meeting, the Securities and Exchange Commission voted by a margin 3-2 to adopt final rules and amendments to implement Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which addresses shareholder advisory votes on executive compensation (“Say on Pay”), the frequency of shareholder advisory votes on executive compensation (“Say on Frequency”) and shareholder advisory votes on golden parachute compensation (“Say on Golden Parachute”). Chairman Schapiro and Commissioners Walter and Aguilar voted in favor of adopting the rules and amendments, and Commissioners Casey and Paredes voted against adopting them.

The Effective Date

The new rules and amendments take effect on April 4, 2011, however, the Dodd-Frank Act requires that any company holding a shareholder meeting on or after January 21, 2011 include in their proxy solicitation materials separate Say on Pay and Say on Frequency votes.

One notable departure from the rules and amendments as initially proposed is the temporary exemption for smaller reporting companies from Say on Pay and Say on Frequency votes until their first annual or other shareholder meeting occurring on or after January 21, 2013.

The following is a summary of the most widely applicable provisions of the new rules and amendments:

Say on Pay Votes

New Exchange Act Rule 14a-21(a) requires that a company hold a separate Say on Pay vote in its first annual or other shareholder meeting occurring on or after January 21, 2011 (or, in the case of a smaller reporting company, on or after January 21, 2013) and, thereafter, at least once every three calendar years. A Say on Pay vote is only required with respect to an annual or other shareholder meeting at which proxies will be solicited for the election of directors.

The Say on Pay vote must relate to all executive compensation disclosed pursuant to Item 402 of Regulation S-K, however, compensation policies and practices related to risk management and risk-taking incentives, as required to be disclosed by Item 402, are only subject to the Say on Pay vote to the extent they are a material part of a company’s compensation policies or decisions for named executive officers, as opposed to compensation policies or decisions for all employees generally.

In the instructions to new Rule 14a-21(a) the Commission gives the following example of a Say on Pay resolution that would satisfy the requirements of Exchange Act Section 14A(a)(1) and Rule 14a-21(a):

RESOLVED, that the compensation paid to the company’s named executive officers, as disclosed pursuant to Item 402 of Regulation S-K, including the Compensation Discussion and Analysis, compensation tables and narrative discussion is hereby APPROVED.

This is a non-exclusive example (and in the case of a smaller reporting company would have to be revised to reflect applicable scaled disclosure requirements, rather than a Compensation Disclosure and Analysis (“CD&A”)). Rule 14a-21(a) does not require a company to use any specific language or form of shareholder resolution.

Also of note, any disclosure of director compensation as required by Item 402 of Regulation S-K is not subject to the Say on Pay vote.

Supplemental Disclosure

In the adopting release, the Commission notes that Rule 14a-21 does not change the scaled disclosure requirements applicable to smaller reporting companies, but that such companies may wish to include additional disclosure in connection with a Say on Pay vote to facilitate shareholder understanding of their compensation arrangements.

The Commission notes that, while not required, the Rule also does not preclude a company from soliciting shareholder approval on specific Say on Pay votes, such as separate votes on cash and other components of compensation.

Say on Frequency Votes

New Exchange Act Rule 14a-21(b) requires that a company hold a separate Say on Frequency vote for the first annual or other shareholder meeting occurring on or after January 21, 2011 (or, in the case of a smaller reporting company, on or after January 21, 2013) and, thereafter, not less than once every six calendar years, to determine whether a Say on Pay vote should be held annually, biennially or triennially. A Say on Frequency vote is only required with respect to an annual or other shareholder meeting at which proxies will be solicited for the election of directors.

Amended Exchange Act Rule 14a-4 requires that proxy cards reflect Say on Frequency choices of 1, 2 or 3 years, or abstain.  A company can vote uninstructed proxies in accordance with management’s recommendation if it follows the existing Rule 14a-4 requirements to include a recommendation for Say on Frequency votes in its proxy materials, permits abstentions and includes language regarding how uninstructed shares will be voted in bold typeface on its proxy cards.

Say on Golden Parachute Votes

New Exchange Act Rule 14a-21(c) requires that a company hold a separate Say on Golden Parachute vote in connection with the solicitation of proxies for approval of an acquisition, merger, consolidation or proposed sale or other disposition of all or substantially all of the company’s assets. Rule 14a-21(c) also offers an exemption from the Say on Golden Parachute vote if a company’s golden parachute compensation has already been disclosed in connection with its annual executive compensation disclosures and has been subject to a prior Say on Pay vote, but only to the extent that the golden parachute compensation arrangements do not change after the Say on Pay vote (other than changes that reflect price movements in a company’s securities or that result in an overall reduction in the value of the total golden parachute compensation).

New Proxy Disclosure Requirements

For Say on Pay and Say on Frequency Votes

New Item 24 has been added to Schedule 14A to require that a company disclose in its proxy solicitation materials that it is providing separate Say on Pay and Say on Frequency votes and explain the general effect of the votes, such as whether they are binding, the current frequency of the Say on Pay vote as determined by the board following the most recent Say on Frequency vote and when the next scheduled Say on Pay vote will occur.

Amendments to Item 402(b) of Regulation S-K require that a company address in its CD&A whether and, if so, how, its compensation policies and decisions have taken into account the results of the most recent Say on Pay vote. A smaller reporting company, which is subject to scaled disclosure requirements under Item 402, rather a CD&A, does not have to make a similar disclosure.

Amendments to Exchange Act Rule 14a-6 add Say on Pay and Say on Frequency votes to the list of items that do not trigger the need to file preliminary proxy materials with the Commission.

For Say on Golden Parachute Votes

New Item 402(t) of Regulation S-K requires that a company  disclose golden parachute compensation arrangements, whether written or unwritten, in both tabular and narrative formats. The new golden parachute compensation table requires quantitative disclosure of individual elements of compensation as well as footnote disclosure regarding amounts of compensation attributable to “single-trigger” and “double-trigger” arrangements.

Golden Parachute Compensation TableSay on Golden Parachute Compensation

Exclusion of Say on Pay and Say on Frequency Shareholder Proposals

An amendment to Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 permits a company to exclude shareholder proposals that would provide for or seek future Say on Pay or Say on Frequency votes if, in the company’s most recent Say on Frequency vote one of the choices (an annual, biennial or triennial frequency) received a majority vote and the company has adopted a policy that is consistent with that choice. Abstentions would not count in the determination of whether a particular Say on Frequency choice has received a majority of votes cast. If, however, no Say on Frequency choice receives a majority of votes cast, then even if a company adopts a policy that is consistent with the choice having received a plurality of votes, it may not be able to exclude shareholder proposals that relate to Say on Pay and Say on Frequency votes.

Disclosing the Results

Amendments to Item 5.07 of Form 8-K require that a company report the results of its Say on Pay and Say on Frequency vote within four business days of the date on which its shareholder meeting ended.  New subsection (d) to Item 5.07 also requires that a company file an amended Form 8-K within 150 days of the date on which its shareholder meeting ended (but in no event later than 60 days before the deadline for submission of shareholder proposals for its next annual meeting) to disclose its decision regarding how frequently to conduct future Say on Pay votes.  A company that fails to file a timely report under Section 5.07 will lose its Form S-3 eligibility.

Smaller Reporting Companies

The new rules temporarily exempt smaller reporting companies from holding Say on Pay and Say on Frequency votes until their first annual or other shareholder meeting occurring on or after January 21, 2013. This temporary exemption does not, however, extend to Say on Golden Parachute votes.

Newly Public Companies

A newly public company is required to include separate resolutions for Say on Pay and Say on Frequency votes in the proxy statement for its first annual shareholder meeting after its initial public offering. 

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How to Search for Proxy Filings in the SEC’s EDGAR Database

by Vanessa Schoenthaler on December 14, 2010

EDGAR, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval system, is used for the automated collection and indexing of filings that are required to be made with the Commission. The EDGAR database provides a portal to those filings, allowing access to certain information on a real-time basis (e.g., current and periodic reports on Forms 8-K, 10-Q and 10-K) and other information on a delayed basis (e.g., comment and response letters, which are generally available 45 days after the Commission has completed it review process).

There are a number of subscriptions services that offer EDGAR search capabilities, all of which provide features not otherwise available through the EDGAR database.  However, if you’re not running highly customized queries or doing sophisticated comparative analyses the EDGAR database probably has everything you need.*

Let’s take a look at how it works …

Right now the first proxy statements that contain proposals addressing shareholder advisory votes on executive compensation (“Say on Pay“) and the frequency of future advisory votes on executive compensation (“Say When on Pay“) are being filed with the Commission. Let’s say you’d like to review one of those proxy statements, but you don’t know which companies are filing them.

Where do you begin? Well, there are a couple of different ways you can go about it:

Starting from the Commission’s homepage (sec.gov), under the Filings & Forms heading, select the Search for Company Filings link:

Securities and Exchange Commission - EDGAR

This will bring you to a list of EDGAR’s main search options:

Securities and Exchange Commission - EDGAR

If you knew the name of the company you were looking for the first option (to search by Company name, ticker, etc.) would be the obvious choice, but since we’ve assumed that you don’t, let’s look at some of your alternative options.

You could select the second link, Most recent filings, and enter the form you’re looking for in the Form Type field. The form type for a definitive proxy statement is DEF 14A, if you wanted to, you could also look at preliminary proxy statements on form type PRE 14A. If you don’t know the form type that you’re looking for you can click on the Form Type link to download a copy of the Commission’s Index of Forms.

Securities and Exchange Commission - EDGAR

While this search method would provide a list of the most recently filed definitive proxy statements, it’s less than ideal for our hypothetical because there’s no way to know whether any of the proxies include proposals addressing shareholder advisory votes unless you review each one.

Going back to EDGAR’s main search options and skipping down to the Custom searches heading you could select the Daily filings link and run a search similar to the one described above, except this form allows you to limit your search to any day within the previous five business days.  Of course, you also have the same problem as above; you’d have to go through each proxy statement until you found one that includes a proposal addressing shareholder advisory votes.Securities and Exchange Commission - EDGAR

This brings us to Full-Text Search, the most efficient way to conduct our proxy search. Again going back to EDGAR’s main search options, if you select the third link from the top, Full text (past four years), you’ll be brought to a simple text search box that allows you to search the full text of all EDGAR filings, including exhibits, for the past four years.  If you then select the link for the Advanced Search Page you can perform the same search using additional features, such as form type and date range.

Securities and Exchange Commission - EDGAR

Using the Advanced Search Page, if you were to search for the phrase “advisory vote” in all definitive proxy statements, on form DEF 14A, filed between October 1, 2010 and today (December 14, 2010), you would find 16 results:Securities and Exchange Commission - EDGAR

If you select the first link for Costco Wholesale Corporation’s definitive proxy statement and scroll down to the Notice of Annual Meeting of Shareholder and you’ll find that Costco’s proxy statement contains proposals addressing both shareholder advisory votes on executive compensation and the frequency of future advisory votes on executive compensation.

Securities and Exchange Commission - EDGAR

It’s that simple. Unless you’re looking for a specific filing by a specific company, the advanced Full-Text Search option is going to be the most useful way for you to search the EDGAR database.

And, if you get stumped along the way, the Filings & Forms section of Commission’s website contains a number of useful tutorials and other resources.

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*There are limitations which may affect both the EDGAR database and subscription services, for example:

  • If you’re looking for filings made before 1996, you may not find them. Companies were first required to submit filings through EDGAR between 1993 and May 6, 1996, before that all filings were submitted to the Commission in paper form.
  • There are specific forms that have only recently been filed through EDGAR (e.g., Forms 3, 4 and 5 were filed through EDGAR on a voluntary basis prior to June 30, 2003 and Form D was strictly a paper filing prior to March 16, 2009).
  • Annual reports to shareholders (the glossy versions) are generally not required to be filed through EDGAR, though companies may do so voluntarily.

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